



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

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May 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

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Director of Performance Evaluation and
Improvement, Central Intelligence Agency

FROM:

J. Foster Collins

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Treasury Representative to NFIB

SUBJECT: Draft Paper: "The Roles of the DCI" (PRM-11, Task 2)

REFERENCE: ICS 77-2146/a of 27 April 1977

I have reviewed the subject draft and believe that it does a good job in setting out the problems and issues, although it is terribly lengthy. All of us might put a little different emphasis in some areas but I agree with your covering note that the paper need not be fully coordinated and agreed at this stage. I do have the following suggestions, however, which I hope you can work into the final version.

In section III-D on the Role of the DCI as Head of the CIA, you put considerable emphasis on the tension between this role and his role as community leader, particularly in debates over resources. In many respects, I suspect the struggle is as much over what resources will go into intelligence versus what will be assigned to non-intelligence functions. The DCI in both roles is certainly looked upon as a partisan for intelligence in this struggle and for this reason departments such as Treasury and State will strongly resist giving him any real authority in dividing up their own resources. If the DCI controlled some separate funds which he could allocate to intelligence community or even non-intelligence elements, they might well be receptive to strengthening certain reporting or analytical units for national intelligence purposes.

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While I agree with the several statements in the draft to the effect that the Foreign Service and other overt collectors must be more responsive to the needs of the intelligence community and must be tied into the system through the DCI, I do not accept the implication that comes through in several places, e.g., pages 97 and 101, that the solution is for the DCI to be given control over the resources and management of departmental intelligence elements. There may be a case for this for such major assets as the Special Air Force and NSA where the national responsibility is over-riding, but not in the case of Treasury, State and other human source collectors. As I pointed out in a comment on your earlier draft, the bulk of the information collected by these non-intelligence reporters in response to their own requirements mechanisms is also in support of general national intelligence needs, in the framing of which the non-intelligence gatherers play an important part. Rather than trying to establish an all inclusive system for human source requirements and guidance which would be very difficult to manage, we should concentrate on strengthening the mechanisms by which the DCI can task these non-intelligence reporters on specific matters of high priority to national intelligence which are not being adequately covered. I believe the non-intelligence departments would be responsive to such a system. There is, I believe, another alternative between d-1 and 2 on page 114 which should be reflected in the paper and which might read "authority to direct high priority national intelligence collection or production from all members of the intelligence community."

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